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Retirement Policies, Employment,
and Unemployment
By RONALD G. EHRENBERG*
There is a growing consensus among econ-
omists that reliance on aggregate demand
policies alone will not be sufficient to move
the economy to full employment with a
nonaccelerating inflation rate, and that poli-
cies which alter the structure of labor markets
will be required. While obvious structural
policies such as public sector employment
programs and training programs are the focus
of current debate, many other public policies
affect labor markets in subtle ways which
may well adversely affect the level and distri-
bution of employment and unemployment. To
help improve the inflation-unemployment
tradeoff, policymakers should seek to mar-
ginally modify these policies, preserving their
benefits while reducing their adverse labor
market effects.
To illustrate these points, this paper
discusses the influence ot public and private
retirement policies on the level and distribu-
tion of employment and unemployment. I
focus on the Social Security system
{OASDHl), the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act {ERISA), the amendment
to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act that raised the permissible mandatory
retirement age to 70, the Supreme Court
decision in the Manhart case prohibiting sex
differentials in employee pension contribu-
tions, and early retirement provisions nego-
tiated in private collective bargaining agree-
ments. Certainly, it would be difficult to
criticize the intent of these policies. However,
each of the public policies adversely affects
the level or distribution of employment and
unemployment. I conclude by noting several
reforms of the method of financing the Social
Security system which would reduce the
system's adverse labor market effects.
•Professor of economics and labor economics, Cornell
University, Support for my research was provided by
NSF Grant No, SOC 77-15800,
I. The Social Security System
The Social Security system influences
labor markets in a variety of ways. First, the
retirement earnings test for receipt of benefits
and the 50 percent marginal tax rate on
earnings above the $4,000 earnings exemp-
tion discourage labor force participation and
employment of the aged (see Michael
Boskin). These parameters, by reducing the
net return to work effort after age 65, also
induce a life cycle reallocation of work effort
from the retirement years to earlier years (see
James Smith). Empirical evidence suggests
that the work week of prime age males may
have increased by over two hours above the
level it otherwise would have been because of
this effect (see Richard Burkhauser and John
Turner).
Second, if employers cannot shift 100
percent of the share of the payroll tax paid by
them onto employees in the form of lower
wages (or smaller wage increases), then firms'
employment decisions will be affected.
Although evidence on the extent of shifting is
mixed, two recent studies concluded that less
than 50 percent of employers' share of the tax
is shifted onto labor (see Daniel Hamermesh,
1977a; the author, Robert Hutchens, and
Robert Smith), which should induce em-
ployers to hire fewer employees than they
would in the tax's absence.
Furthermore, the existence of a maximum
taxable earnings level causes payroll tax rate
increases to increase the cost of low-wage
employees relative to the costs of high-wage
employees. If relative wages do not fully
adjust, increases in the tax rate should lead
firms to substitute high-wage for low-wage
workers. In contrast, increases in the taxable
earnings level reduce the incentives for such
substitution (see John Pencavel). Between
1960 and 1978, the OASDHl tax rate more
than doubled, while the maximum taxable
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earnings level rose from $4,800 to $17,700,
The latter change has likely dominated the
former, causing a reduction in employers'
incentives to substitute high-wage for low-
wage employees and a shift in the distribution
of employment (unemployment) towards
(away from) low-skilled individuals.
The share of the payroll tax either nomi-
nally paid by employees or implicitly paid by
them in the form of lower wages has a
differential impact on different classes of
individuals. For individuals outside the labor
force it has a pure substitution effect, discour-
aging labor force participation. For employed
individuals earning more than the taxable
earnings level, it has a pure income effect,
stimulating increased work effort. For em-
ployed individuals earning less than the
taxable wage base, both effects are present,
and the net impact is ambiguous.
The large increases in both the tax rate and
maximum taxable earnings levels during the
past decade may have reduced the work effort
of individuals who earned more than the
maximum taxable level prior to the increase,
but less after. Although the impact of these
changes on the unemployment rate is am-
biguous, their net effect was probably to
reduce the growth rate of employment. This
effect may have been partially offset by the
accompanying liberalization of promised
future benefits. Since eligibility for OASI
benefits depends upon career work effort,
promised higher future benefit levels may
stimulate greater work effort on the part of
nonaged workers. However, this entitlement
effect is likely to be greatest for low-wage
workers as the benefit-earnings ratio declines
as earnings rise. Moreover, since married
females have the option of receiving either
their own benefits or 50 percent of their
husband's benefits (100 percent after he
dies), their lifetime work effort entitles them
to only small net additional OASI benefits
and the entitlement effect is likely to be
unimportant for them.
Finally, recent evidence suggests that the
Social Security system may substantially
reduce private savings (see Martin Feldstein,
1974a,b 1976; Alicia Munnell, 1974; and for
contrasting evidence, Robert Barro), This net
reduction is not offset by an increase in public
savings because of the pay-as-you-go nature
of the system. As a result, total savings and
capital accumulation in the economy are
reduced, leading to reduced growth in produc-
tivity and output, and ultimately to reduced
rates of growth of employment and/or real
wages. Recent increases in Social Security
taxes and promised future benefits levels have
likely exacerbated this effect.
In sum, the parameters of the system inter-
act to produce numerous effects on labor
markets. The reduction in labor force partici-
pation and employment of the aged is a
planned effect and should not be judged a
negative feature. In contrast, the OASDHl
payroll tax on employers and employees and
the unfunded nature of the retirement trust
fund probably serve to reduce both the labor
force participation rates and employment
levels of the nonaged. The parameters of the
system also differentially influence the distri-
bution of employment and unemployment
across sex classes and earnings classes of
employees. Recent changes in the system's
parameters probably have marginally slowed
the growth rate of employment and reduced
employers' incentives to substitute high- for
low-skilled labor.
II. Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
The ERISA was designed to increase the
probability that private sector employees
receive promised retirement benefits. It
includes provisions requiring liberalized vest-
ing rules, more stringent funding require-
ments, and increased fiduciary responsibility.
These provisions increase employers' costs of
providing pensions and should lead employers
to shift at least part of the increased costs to
employees in the form of lower wages, smaller
wage increases, or pension plan terminations.
Although it is too early to assess ERISA's
impact on wages, recent studies show that a
tradeoff exists between wages and retirement
system characteristics in both the private and
public sectors (see the author; Alan Gustman
and Martin Segal; Randall Weiss and Brad-
ley Schiller), If employers cannot fully shift
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ERISA's costs, unit labor costs will increase,
resulting in a reduction in the level (or rate of
growth) of private employment. This reduc-
tion would be concentrated in those firms with
pension plans whose pre-ERISA provisions
did not meet the ERISA standards. Adoption
of ERISA-type controls over public em-
ployees' retirement systems would have a
similar negative impact on employment in the
public sector.
The ERISA-typc controls also affect the
level of pension plan funding and composition
of pension funds' portfolios. By requiring
pension plans to be fully funded, they increase
the stock of curent pension fund assets which,
if not offset by a decline in individuals' saving,
will increase the level of capital accumulation
and ultimately the level of" employment. On
the other hand, by restricting the type of
investments which pension funds may make,
the controls prevent pension fund assets from
being invested in projects with the highest
expected rate of return (but also highest risk)
and hence reduce the rate of productivity
growth. Without empirical evidence, one can
not ascertain which of these effects domi-
nates.
III. Mandatory Retirement
The amendment to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act passed by Congress
earlier this year, subject to a few exceptions,
raises from 65 to 70 the age at which
employers may compel their employees to
retire. This will influence the level and distri-
bution of employment in a number of ways.
Mandatory retirement provisions tend to be
found in large establishments which are
unionized and in which employees usually
have long actual or expected job tenure (see
Edward Lazear), The typical life cycle rela-
tionship between an individual's earnings and
productivity in firms, where an implicit long-
term contract exists between the firm and its
employees, is one in which earnings first
exceed productivity, then productivity ex-
ceeds earnings, and finally earnings again
exceed productivity. These stages correspond
to a period of formal or informal training, a
period of peak productivity, and a final period
in which productivity is declining, but infor-
mal rules or union contracts prevent wages
from being cut. The age at which this latter
period starts, if at all, varies widely across
individuals and depends upon factors such as
the employee's health and the demands of his
or her specific job. The establishment of a
mandatory retirement age at an age such
that, on average, the present value of
employees' earnings just equals the present
value of their productivity allows a firm to
maximize its expected presented value of its
profits. Such rules also allow increases in the
present value of employees' earnings over
their life cycles (see Lazear).
If the legislation induces some individuals
to postpone their retirement, then on average
the present value of wages will exceed the
present value of marginal productivities over
employees' careers. Employers may respond
by negotiating flatter or everywhere lower
real wage profiles. The overall level of
employment would be unchanged, however
new hires would be reduced, because the
average employee would have a longer work-
life. Hence, some jobs would be redistributed
from new hires, primarily youths,, to the aged.
Further if employers face any difficulty in
making wage adjustments, then they will tend
to reduce their stock of employees, causing
still larger reductions in new hires.
The change may also discourage employers
from hiring middle-aged employees. Prior to
the legislation, a firm would be willing to hire
a middle-aged worker provided that his
expected present value of marginal productiv-
ities less wages was nonnegative. If expected
wages at the old retirement age exceeded
expected marginal productivities, the legisla-
tive-induced increase in the expected retire-
ment age reduces the firm's incentive to hire
middle-aged workers and the maximum age
at which it will hire new employees. Indeed,
this provides employers an added incentive to
prefer young rather than middle-aged new
hires, and partially offsets the legislation's
negative impact on youth employment (see
Barry Chiswick and Carmel Chiswick).
However, to the extent that the legislation
reduces the number of retirees per year,
employers may be forced to increase layoffs to
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achieve desired lower employment levels in
periods of declining aggregate demand, caus-
ing a further redistribution of employment
away from those with the least seniority and
increasing the measured unemployment
rate.
The magnitudes of all of these effects
depend upon the number of retirements post-
poned in response to the legislation; one
recent study concluded some 200,000 aged
employees would be added to the work force
in the first year (see U.S. Department of
Labor). However, growth in real incomes,
private pensions, and Social Security benefits
have reduced males' average age at retire-
ment and as long as the Social Security
retirement earnings test rules are maintained,
workers aged 65 face a substantial incentive
to retire. Thus, although the legislated change
may marginally alter the distribution of
employment and unemployment across age
groups, its overall effect on the level of
employment is likely to be small. It may,
however, also substantially slow the progress
of nonwhites into professional positions (see
George Johnson and Juli Malveaux).
IV. The Manhart Case
On April 25, 1978, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared that employers who require
females to contribute a greater proportion of
their salaries than males to contributory
pension plans are committing illegal sex
discrimination (see City of Los Angeles vs.
Manhart). However, because female life
expectancies are longer than males', to main-
tain the actuarial soundness of a defined
benefit pension plan females must either (a)
receive Jower annual retirement benefits than
otherwise identical males, or (b) receive equal
annual retirement benefits, with larger
annual contributions being made for females.
The Supreme Court decision prohibits (b)
unless the larger contribution is nominally
paid by employers. This increases the relative
costs of female employees, providing em-
ployers with an incentive to substitute males
for females.
One proposal to eliminate this incentive is
to use a "unisex" mortality table, calculated
by weighting the relevant male and female
mortality tables by the proportion of
employees of each sex employed by a firm.
Equal net contribution rates for all employees
of a given age necessary to fully fund equal
retirement benefits per year for retirees of
each sex could then be determined. However,
employers should realize that by reducing the
proportion of females in their work force, they
would reduce their required average net
contributions (see Burt Barnow and the
author). The likely magnitude of this substi-
tution depends upon the true pension cost
diiTerential between males and female em-
ployees, and the extent to which males and
females are substitutes in production. The
former is likely to be quite small in plans
which provide survivors benefits for spouses of
beneficiaries, while precise estimates of the
latter have yet to be obtained (see Hamer-
mesh and James Grant).
V. Early Retirement
Early retirement provisions contained in
many privately negotiated contracts typically
allow early retirement at reduced benefit
levels. While early retirement provisions are
of value to employees, they also have the
effect of redistributing employment losses
across age groups of employees during periods
of low or declining demand which may well
reduce employers' costs.
Union contracts typically require that
layoffs be inversely related to seniority;
however utilizing such a policy to reduce
employment may not be optimal from an
employer's prospective. Due to the experi-
ence-rated nature of the unemployment insur-
ance {Ul) payroll tax, after some point layoffs
raise the employer's payroll tax. Moreover, if
the firm's most senior workers are in the stage
of their life cycles in which wages exceed
marginal productivities, the firm would best
be served by reducing their employment
rather than younger workers. Furthermore, if
these senior workers voluntarily leave their
jobs, an employer's Ul tax rate would not
increase as voluntary separations are not
eligible for Ul benefits in most states. Early
retirement provisions thus allow employers to
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redistribute employment losses in periods of
low or declining demand from younger to
older workers and to reduce their Ul payroll
tax contributions (see James Medoff). Since
retirees tend to be out of the labor force, these
policies probably do reduce the measured
unemployment rate.
VI. Conclusion
All of the retirement policies discussed in
this paper, except for privately negotiated
early retirement provisions, were shown to
have adverse effects on the level and distribu-
tion of employment and unemployment.
These examples support the contention that
more explicit attention should be given to the
employment effects of social programs prior
to their adoption and that consideration
should be given to restructuring existing
programs to reduce their adverse labor
market effects. While each of the effects is
probably quite small, their sum may be siz-
able.
Three examples of possible changes in the
financing of the Social Security system illus-
trate the types of restructuring one might
consider. First, the use of general revenue
financing from personal and corporate income
tax revenues, for all or some fraction of future
system revenue needs, would reduce em-
ployer's incentives to substitute capital for
iabor. Second, increasing system revenues by
more than is necessary to fund benefits in the
short-run to build up a larger Social Security
trust fund, and using this fund to buy
outstanding government debt, would increase
the social rate of savings and capital accumu-
lation which ultimately would result in
increased rates of growth of employment (see
Feldstein, 1977), Third, raising the maximum
taxable earnings level, rather than the payroll
tax rate, to meet future system revenue needs
would reduce employers' incentives to substi-
tute high-wage for low-wage workers. To the
extent that the overall rate of wage inflation is
influenced more by the level of excess demand
for labor in high-wage labor markets than
that in low-wage labor markets, this change
will also reduce the unemployment rate asso-
ciated with each level of inflation (see Martin
Baily and James Tobin; George Johnson and
Arthur Blakemore).
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